Oil markets have reacted sharply to the reports of Israeli airstrikes and other attacks on Iran's nuclear and ballistic missiles infrastructure and several key personnel. WTI & Brent both were up by almost 10% by Friday’s close. However, despite the ~$10/b move higher in oil over the past three days, even a potential 1 mb/d drop in Iranian production is likely not fully reflected in the price yet, let alone an escalation that could involve disruption to energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz. At Friday’s close of Brent at 75$ levels, the geopolitical premium has flared up to $10 above our model-derived fair value of $65, indicating a 15% probability of a worst-case scenario, where supply impact extends beyond the reduction in Iranian oil exports and price reaction is exponential rather than linear. Iran has suffered significant damage to its leadership, military, and industrial capabilities, and its nuclear program, and its response will shape the endgame of this conflict and the future of the region. Our own view is that Israel has slowly & steadily removed several middle east nuisance elements starting with Iranian proxies, Hamas and finally now Iran. In short term it can be a pain but in medium term, this augurs well for a rule based peace in middle east. This should lower the geo political risk premium in crude in medium term. We also believe that Iran’s current leadership is likely to be toppled either by Israel/US attacks or by internal forces. The manner in which Israel has attacked Iranian’s top military leadership, air defence system and missile launching sites implies large scale internal support. This too should augur well for Iranian crude to come back to global market without sanctions. On Iranian oil infrastructure, we estimate that Iran crude production stands at 3.6mb/d, that it produces about 0.8mb/d of condensates, and that total liquids seaborne exports have averaged 1.8 mb/d year-to-date with a large 1.2mb/d contribution from China. Striking Iranian upstream assets i.e. the crude production fields is unlikely to gain favor with the US administration, which would be wary of disrupting oil markets. We can assume a reasonably pessimistic scenario that any potential damage to Iran’s export infrastructure reduces Iran supply by 1.8mb/d during 6 months before gradually recovering. Making the additional assumption that extra core OPEC+ production makes up half of the peak Iranian shortfall, we estimate that Brent jumps to a peak just over $90/bbl but declines back to the $60s in 2026 as Iran supply recovers. The worst case scenario is interruption of trade through Strait of Hormuz where 1/5 of nearly global oil production flows (16 mbpd crude & 5.5 mbpd crude products). Core OPEC+ producers may be unable to deploy spare capacity in this extreme tail scenario. We estimate that oil prices may exceed $100/bbl in an extreme tail scenario of an extended disruption. In summary, we see short term upside risks but medium term downside. OPEC+ supply may raise supply for longer than our base case where OPEC8+ delivers a final increase in August 2025. Also while the risk of a US recession in the next 12 months has declined to 30%, a recession remains more likely than usual given ongoing trade policy uncertainty. With US policy explicit focus on low crude prices, we don’t see Brent sustaining above 80 levels. Either the current Iranian leadership will exit (a high probability event for us) or they will resort to low intensity measures for some time & then cool off the attacks on Israel & accept being a non-nuclear state.